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I. INTRODUCTION
Jon’s Guns, a federally-licensed firearms dealer, has amassed a large
following on Facebook, 1 a platform it deems critical for marketing to and keeping
in touch with customers.2 Jon’s Guns’ Facebook page was unpublished and no
longer visible to the public after certain posts allegedly violated the social
network’s community standards for regulated goods. 3 However, Jon’s Guns
contends that the content on its Facebook page complied with community
standards as it merely advertised firearms for sale at its store location and
followed all federal, state, and local regulations. 4 Industry representatives argue
that such seemingly random action has deprived companies of key advertising
platforms.5
Many other companies operating in the firearms industry have also had their
Facebook pages unpublished despite adhering to the social network’s community
standards, with many noting that Facebook has been particularly aggressive in
unpublishing firearms dealers’ pages. 6 While Facebook ultimately restored Jon’s
Guns’ page and acknowledged its error after being contacted by news media, 7
Jon’s Guns’ story illustrates the importance of using social media platforms to
connect businesses with customers and the impact that social media companies,
1. Jon’s Guns (@jonsgunsva), F ACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/jonsgunsva/ (last visited Apr. 5,
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. See Justin Soto, Bristol Gun Store Owner Wants Answers After Facebook Unpublished Page,
NEXSTAR BROADCASTING, INC. (Apr. 4, 2018, 10:01 AM), http://www.wjhl.com/local/bristol-gun-store-ownerwants-answers-after-facebook-unpublished-page/1099638692 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (quoting Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted 95 percent of the company’s advertising is
through Facebook).
3. Id.
4. Id.; see also Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ (last
visited Apr. 5, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (allowing firearms dealers to
advertise firearms for sale at store locations if they comply with applicable regulations but prohibiting their use
of Facebook’s payment tools to conduct transactions).
5. See Soto, supra note 2 (quoting Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted “sales drop
immediately” if the company does not post frequently on its Facebook page).
6. See Bryan Schatz & Alexander Sammon, Facebook’s Ban on Gun Sales is Being Enforced by a Few
Dedicated Users, MOTHER JONES (June 27, 2016, 10:00 AM),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/06/gun-sales-facebook-flagged-reported/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Overzealous gun-group flaggers sometimes hit the wrong targets. The
gun-sale ban only affects sales between individuals, not sales by federally licensed firearms dealers. . . . [P]ages
for brick-and-mortar gun shops have been taken down wrongfully at times.”); Mike Monteiro (@monteiro),
TWITTER (June 23, 2016, 9:42 AM),
https://twitter.com/monteiro/status/746020715552374784?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fw
ww.motherjones.com%2Fpolitics%2F2016%2F06%2Fgun-sales-facebook-flagged-reported%2F (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Facebook is erratic in following its own guidelines.”).
7. Justin Soto, Facebook Apologizes to Bristol Gun Shop After Mistakenly Removing Page, NEXSTAR
BROADCASTING, INC. (Apr. 4, 2018, 11:27 PM), http://www.wjhl.com/local/facebook-apologizes-to-bristolgun-shop-after-mistakenly-removing-page/1102309621 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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as gatekeepers, may have on businesses when determining whether content is
inappropriate without any oversight. 8
The power social media companies have over businesses is not limited to
restricting access to their pages. 9 Certain companies have also been affected by
YouTube demonetizing10 content on their business channels.11 Dave Rubin hosts
The Rubin Report, a talk show on YouTube, during which he discusses “politics,
polarizing issues, current events, and more” with thought leaders and authors. 12
After YouTube lost $750 million in advertising sales for allegedly playing
advertisements on videos containing offensive content, it removed
advertisements from The Rubin Report’s videos that dealt with controversial
topics.13
Mr. Rubin expressed concern over YouTube’s decision because it may
impact business decisions for companies using its platform. 14 Mr. Rubin noted
that the production of content entails significant costs, including studio rentals,
transportation, and lodging to accommodate the interviewee, among other costs. 15
When YouTube demonetizes this content, producing the content becomes less
profitable or even unprofitable, which is not a sustainable business model. 16
Thus, companies will either be unable to create new content or will be forced to
alter their content to appease YouTube. 17
The Internet, which is constantly evolving and largely unregulated, has
transformed the ways in which information is shared, people interact, and
business is conducted.18 The modern development of web-based companies and

8. See Soto, supra note 2 (quoting Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted “sales drop
immediately” if the company does not post frequently on its Facebook page); Schatz & Sammon, supra note 6
(“Overzealous gun-group flaggers sometimes hit the wrong targets. The gun-sale ban only affects sales between
individuals, not sales by federally licensed firearms dealers. . . . [P]ages for brick-and-mortar gun shops have
been taken down wrongfully at times.”).
9. See Ramona Pringle, ‘De-monetizing’ YouTube: What Does It Mean You Will See?, CBC RADIOCANADA (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/youtube-advertising-demonetization-1.3755626
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting social media companies, such as YouTube, may
also restrict ad revenue based on a page’s content).
10. Id. (defining “demonetizing” as the ability for YouTube to decide “which videos can collect ad
revenue, based on whether they are deemed advertiser-friendly”).
11. The Rubin Report, Thoughts on YouTube Demonetization, YOUTUBE (May 17, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q4D0TBPd3JU (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
12. The Rubin Report, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/user/RubinReport/about (last visited Apr. 4,
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
13. Thoughts on YouTube Demonetization, supra note 11.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Gawker and Testing the Limits of Free Speech, CBS NEWS (Mar. 20, 2016, 9:09 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/gawker-and-testing-the-limits-of-free-speech/ (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review); Zaryn Dentzel, How the Internet has Changed Everyday Life, OPENMIND,
https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/article/internet-changed-everyday-life/?fullscreen=true (last visited Apr. 4,
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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their impact on both national and international commerce 19 requires us to rethink
the extent to which social media companies should be allowed to control content
on their websites in ways that impact business activities and, ultimately,
consumers.20 Some have suggested that this control could violate antitrust
regulations.21 However, the control of content by social media companies does
not fit within the existing antitrust regulatory framework because it is not
designed to harm the opportunities of competitors.22
Instead, new regulations are necessary to regulate social media companies’
control of online business activity because these companies have an increasing
impact on consumer purchasing activity,23 and their ability to control content at
their discretion impacts the ability of affected businesses to compete in the
marketplace.24 Part II of this Comment first examines the rise in Internet and
social media use and its impact on modern businesses. 25 Part III of this Comment
then discusses the existing antitrust regulatory framework and its shortfalls in
regulating social media companies’ control of content on business pages. 26 It then
discusses the history of regulation of public utilities and railroads and common
law innkeeper obligations, and compares the companies in these industries to
social media companies. 27 Part III concludes with a discussion of the market
failure relating to social media companies’ discretionary control of content on
business pages as grounds to introduce new regulations for social media
companies.28 Part IV of this Comment proposes that the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) publish clear and transparent uniform guidelines
concerning the control of content on business pages and establish an independent
review board that businesses can appeal to. 29 This is followed by a discussion of
the objections to imposing additional regulations on social media companies. 30

19. Dentzel, supra note 18.
20. See supra Part I (highlighting social media companies’ role as gatekeepers and the impact their
control over content may have on businesses using their websites as a primary advertising platform).
21. Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1771, 1804 (2012).
22. See infra Part III.A (discussing that even if a social media company were to achieve monopoly
power, its control of content must be anticompetitive in nature to constitute a violation of antitrust laws).
23. See infra Part II (discussing the rise in Internet and social media use and its impact on modern
businesses).
24. See infra Part IV (illustrating the inconsistency in social media companies’ control of content and its
impact on affected businesses); Soto, supra note 2 (quoting Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted
“sales drop immediately” if the company does not post frequently on its Facebook page); Thoughts on YouTube
Demonetization, supra note 11 (discussing that when YouTube demonetizes content, producing the content
becomes less profitable or even unprofitable, which is not a sustainable business model).
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.A.
27. See infra Part III.B.
28. See infra Part III.C.
29. See infra Part IV.A.
30. See infra Part IV.B.

130

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50
II. THE RISE IN INTERNET USE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE FLOW OF COMMERCE
The Internet has become essential to the flow of commerce. 31 In 2017,
approximately 54% of the world population used the Internet, an increase of 34%
from 2007.32 Given the rise in Internet use, modern businesses have shifted from
print to online advertising33 and frequently advertise online through business
pages created on social media websites. 34 Businesses have also begun selling
their products directly to consumers through the Internet. 35 Digital and mobile
advertising comprises approximately 41% of advertisers’ spending, which is
roughly the same as the amount spent on television advertising. 36 In contrast,
print advertising only constitutes roughly 10% of advertisers’ spending. 37 For
businesses with small advertising budgets, the creation of business pages on
social media websites, in particular, is “crucial” to create brand awareness as
these businesses lack the funds required to produce widespread television and
Internet advertising campaigns. 38
In 2017, there were more than 2.13 billion monthly active users on Facebook
worldwide—an increase of 14% over the prior year.39 In 2015, “Facebook
influenced 52 percent of consumers’ online and offline purchases, up from 36
percent in 2014.” 40 Further, over 50 million small businesses connect with
customers through Facebook pages.41 While Facebook is the market leader of
social networking websites, as of January 2018, YouTube, Instagram, and
31. See Dentzel, supra note 18 (“[A]ll sorts of advantages arise from e-commerce, which has become a
major distribution channel for goods and services. You can book airline tickets, get a T-shirt from Australia, or
buy food at an online grocery store. New applications support secure business transactions and create new
commercial opportunities.”).
32. Internet Growth Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/
emarketing.htm (last updated Apr. 3, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
33. Natasha D. Smith, Ad Budgets Continue the Shift to Digital, DMN (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://www.dmnews.com/marketing-strategy/ad-budgets-continue-the-shift-to-digital/article/491451/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
34. See Soto, supra note 2 (quoting Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted “sales drop
immediately” if the company does not post frequently on its Facebook page).
35. Catalin Zorzini, How to Create a Facebook Shop Page: A Step-by-Step Guide (April 2018),
ECOMMERCE PLATFORMS (Dec. 14, 2015), https://ecommerce-platforms.com/ecommerce-selling-advice/howto-create-a-facebook-shop-page (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
36. Smith, supra note 33.
37. Id.
38. Steve Olenski, Social Media for Small Business: How It’s Different from How Big Brands Do It,
FORBES (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveolenski/2015/10/29/social-media-for-smallbusiness-how-its-different-from-how-big-brands-do-it/#69311d163974 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
39. The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics, ZEPHORIA DIG. MKTG., https://zephoria.com/top-15valuable-facebook-statistics/ (last updated Apr. 3, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
40. Liis Hainla, 21 Social Media Marketing Statistics You Need to Know in 2017, DREAMGROW (Aug.
16, 2017), https://www.dreamgrow.com/21-social-media-marketing-statistics/ (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
41. Id.
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Twitter had approximately 1.5 billion, 800 million, and 330 million monthly
active users, respectively. 42
Because a select few social media companies, including Facebook, YouTube,
Instagram, and Twitter, dominate the market, it is difficult for small businesses,
in particular, to seek out equally effective alternative online platforms should
social medial companies affect their business pages.43 Shutting off smaller
businesses’ access to the marketplace is detrimental as there is “nothing small
about the impact [small businesses] have on our economy.” 44 Small businesses
provide approximately 60% to 80% of all jobs in the United States, and “small
businesses produce 13 times more patents than larger firms.” 45 Thus, these
businesses must have access to the resources they need to grow, including the
platforms offered by social media companies. 46 A denial of access to these
platforms, in turn, affects the public’s access to competitively priced products
and services.47
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING ANTITRUST REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE REGULATION OF SOCIAL MEDIA COMPANIES
Federal antitrust laws prohibit business practices that interfere with
competition in the marketplace. 48 Thus, when a business feels it has been treated
unfairly by a large web-based company, the existing antitrust regulatory
framework is likely the first area of law it will look to for protection. 49 After all, a
number of large web-based companies have recently been investigated and
subjected to litigation under antitrust laws in the United States and Europe. 50
42. Most Famous Social Network Sites Worldwide as of January 2018, Ranked by Number of Active
Users (in Millions), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-bynumber-of-users/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
43. See id. (ranking the most popular social networking websites worldwide); Olenski, supra note 38
(noting that for businesses with small advertising budgets, the creation of business pages on social media
websites is “crucial”).
44. Rebecca O. Bagley, Small Businesses = Big Impact, FORBES (May 15, 2012, 2:08 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccabagley/2012/05/15/small-businesses-big-impact/#56ced33575cd (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
45. Id.
46. See id. (discussing the large impact of small businesses on our economy).
47. See Guide to Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competitionguidance/guide-antitrust-laws (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(noting that market competition results in lower prices for consumers).
48. Antitrust Laws and You, DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-laws-and-you (last
updated Jan. 5, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
49. See Waller, supra note 21, at 1771 (noting several web-based companies, including Google, Twitter,
and Facebook, “have been referred to as ‘monopolies’ in the colloquial sense”).
50. Id.; see also Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, In
the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 3, 2013), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commission-regarding-googlessearch-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(describing the FTC’s investigation of Google “relating to allegations that Google unfairly preference[d] its own
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However, the reach of the existing regulations in the United States is limited and
does not capture all conduct impacting competition in the marketplace, including
social media companies’ control of content on business pages. 51
Section A outlines the existing antitrust regulatory framework and discusses
the shortfalls of this framework in regulating the control of business content by
social media companies. 52 Section B then discusses the history of regulation of
public utilities and railroads and innkeeper obligations, and compares the
companies in these industries to social media companies. 53 Section C concludes
with a discussion of the market failure relating to social media companies’
discretionary control of content on business pages 54 as grounds to introduce new
regulations for social media companies. 55
A. The Existing Antitrust Regulatory Framework and its Limitations
The federal government enforces three major antitrust laws: 56 the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 57 the Clayton Act, 58 and the Sherman Antitrust Act. 59
This Comment focuses on the shortfalls of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act (“Section 2”) in regulating the control of business content by social media
companies.60 Section 2 prohibits the monopolization of interstate commerce, 61
which is accomplished when “one firm controls the market for a product or
service, and it has obtained that market power, not because its product or service
is superior to others, but by suppressing competition with anticompetitive
conduct.” 62 Thus, to constitute illegal monopolization under Section 2, a
company must not only obtain market power, but must also engage in
anticompetitive conduct. 63 Subsection 1 considers how a social media company

content on the Google search results page and selectively demote[d] its competitors’ content from those
results”); European Commission Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google
on Android Operating System and Applications, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1492_en.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(noting Google was subject to several investigations under the European Union’s antitrust laws, including for
favorably displaying its own services in search results and restricting advertisers, among other things).
51. See infra Part III.A (discussing that even if a social media company were to achieve monopoly
power, its control of content must be anticompetitive in nature to violate antitrust laws).
52. See infra Part III.A.
53. See infra Part III.B.
54. See infra Part III.C.
55. See infra Part IV.
56. Antitrust Laws and You, supra note 48.
57. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West 2006) (barring unfair competition practices).
58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 1996) (prohibiting mergers and acquisitions that may potentially reduce
competition).
59. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2004).
60. See infra Part III.A.
61. 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2004).
62. Antitrust Laws and You, supra note 48.
63. Id.; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
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may achieve market power and discusses why even Facebook, the market leader,
likely falls short.64 Subsection 2 differentiates the types of behavior that
constitute anticompetitive conduct from the control of business content by social
media companies.65
1. Achieving Market Power
Courts assess the first element, the presence of market power, primarily
based on a company’s market share. 66 Courts have generally held that “a 90%
share of a well-defined market” is a monopoly, and some courts have found a
75% share to be sufficient. 67 However, courts are disinclined to find a monopoly
power if a company’s share of a well-defined market is less than 70%, and
several courts have found a share of less than 50% to be insufficient as a matter
of law.68 If a court is confident that the relevant market is accurately defined, it is
more willing to find a monopoly power when a company’s market share falls on
the lower-end of the above ranges. 69 Conversely, courts will require a larger
market share “if a market is poorly defined or there is doubt that entry barriers
are sufficiently high.” 70
Scholars have suggested at least three measures to calculate the market share
for social media companies: user markets, advertising markets, and data
markets.71 Each of these measures is impacted by which subset of websites are
determined to fit within the defined product and geographic markets 72 that
comprise the relevant market. 73
User markets are based on users of the social media websites. 74 The
measurement of total users may be based on either viewers or registered users of
the social media websites, which often merge because viewers must be registered
users to view the full website. 75 Despite Facebook’s rapid growth in monthly
active users over the years, its market share based on website visits has declined
PRACTICE 296 (4th ed. 2011) (“The framers of the Sherman Act did not intend to condemn someone ‘who
merely by superior skill and intelligence got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he
could.’”).
64. See infra Part III.A.1.
65. See infra Part III A.2.
66. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 293; Waller, supra note 21, at 1775.
67. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 293.
68. Id. at 293–94.
69. Id. at 294.
70. Id.
71. Waller, supra note 21, at 1780–81, 1784.
72. Id. at 1776, 1779 (explaining that product and geographic markets encompass the “group of products
and services that consumers view as reasonably effective substitutes”).
73. See id. at 1778 (noting that the product and geographic markets encompassing “social networking
websites” is “often overextended to include many . . . interactive websites and software platforms where user
content is generated and shared”).
74. Id. at 1780.
75. Id. at 1781.
ITS
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during the past ten years—from a high of approximately 70% to 39% at the end
of 2017.76 This is due to the increased use of other social networking websites,
including YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram. 77 Thus, this measure of market share
may vary significantly based on the entry and exit of new social networking
websites.78
Advertising markets are based on the social media website’s share of
advertising revenues generated through sales of online display ads to
advertisers.79 Facebook, which includes Instagram, 80 had a digital display ad
market share of approximately 35% at the end of 2016. 81 This figure is expected
to increase to 44% by the end of 2019. 82
Data markets are based on “information that users post to their social
networking sites or reveal through communications with others on the network,
whether other users, advertisers, or application developers.” 83 This measure is
based on the premise that a social networking website’s true value is in the
information it gathers from its users. 84
Aside from a determination of market share, barriers to entry and exit offer
another indication of market power.85 If the barriers to entry are low, even a
company with a dominant market share may lack the ability to control prices. 86
While creating a functioning social media website is relatively easy and
inexpensive, there is significant value, and thus a barrier to entry, in the volume
of “users, advertisers, and application developers.” 87 For example, Facebook’s
number of monthly active users significantly outnumbers its competitors’, 88

76. Pritt Kallas, Top 10 Social Networking Sites by Market Share Statistics [November 2017],
DREAMGROW (Dec. 4, 2017), http://www.dreamgrow.com/top-10-social-networking-sites-market-share-ofvisits/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
77. Id.
78. See id. (highlighting a drastic decline in Facebook’s market share based on website visits as a result
of the increasing popularity of new social networking websites).
79. Waller, supra note 21, at 1781.
80. See Press Release, Facebook to Acquire Instagram, F ACEBOOK (Apr. 9, 2012),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2012/04/facebook-to-acquire-instagram/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (announcing Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram).
81. Ginny Marvin, Report: Facebook’s Display Ad Domination to Grow as US Digital Ad Spend Hits
$83B in 2017, MKTG. LAND (Mar. 14, 2017, 9:38 AM), https://marketingland.com/emarketer-facebookdominate-15-9-pct-digital-ad-spend-growth-2017-209045 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
82. Id.
83. Waller, supra note 21, at 1784.
84. Id. at 1784–85.
85. Id. at 1786.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1786–88 (“For social networking sites, it is important to quickly achieve, and then maintain, a
critical mass of users, advertisers, and application developers.”).
88. See Most Famous Social Network Sites Worldwide as of January 2018, Ranked by Number of Active
Users (in Millions), supra note 42 (highlighting that Facebook has nearly 700 million more monthly active
users than YouTube, the social media website with the second largest number of monthly active users).
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making the network “immensely more valuable” than competing networks. 89
However, Facebook, the market leader of social media websites, has likely
not achieved market power under the existing antitrust regulatory framework,
despite its rapid growth and unique barriers to entry, as it lacks “the dominant
market share of well-defined product and geographic markets with high entry
barriers.”90 Because the suggested measures to calculate market share are
volatile, Facebook, or any other social media company, may achieve monopoly
power at some point. 91 However, such power may be temporary, 92 and it is not
clear which measure, if any, enforcement agencies and courts will find represents
a well-defined market.93
2. Behavior Constituting Anticompetitive Conduct
The second element, anticompetitive conduct, includes acts that “are
reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by
impairing the opportunities of rivals.”94 While courts have developed numerous
tests to determine whether conduct is anticompetitive, the tests focus on conduct
impacting a company’s rivals, not its users.95 In addition, in United States v.
Colgate & Co., the Supreme Court held that, “in the absence of any purpose to
create or maintain a monopoly,” Section 2 does not prohibit a private company
from exercising its “own independent discretion as to parties with whom [it] will
deal.”96
When social media companies control content on business pages, their
decisions impact users of the website, and users may or may not be competitors
of the social media companies. 97 Even if an impacted business is a competitor of
the social media company, social media companies are private companies with

89. Waller, supra note 21, at 1788.
90. Id. at 1804; see also Most Famous Social Network Sites Worldwide as of January 2018, Ranked by
Number of Active Users (in Millions), supra note 42 (“The most popular social networks usually display a high
number of user accounts or strong user engagement. For example, market leader Facebook was the first social
network to surpass 1 billion monthly active users[.]”).
91. See Kallas, supra note 76 (highlighting a drastic decline in Facebook’s market share based on
website visits as a result of the increasing popularity of new social networking websites).
92. See id. (noting that as users diversify their social media use, a social media company’s market share
may be highly volatile).
93. Waller, supra note 21, at 1792.
94. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 298; see, e.g., Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding
Google’s Search Practices, supra note 50 (finding that Google’s “display of its own vertical content at or near
the top of its search results page” had a valid business justification, despite harming competitors, as “data
showing how consumers reacted . . . suggest[s] that users benefitted from these changes”).
95. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 298–99; see, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (holding that the refusal of an owner of three of four major ski areas in Aspen,
Colorado to cooperate with its smaller competitor violated Section 2).
96. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
97. See supra Part I (discussing Facebook and YouTube’s control of content on users’ business pages).
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the option to refrain from providing services to competitors. 98 Furthermore,
social media companies’ decisions to control content reflect content preferences
rather than an attempt to create or maintain a monopoly. 99
For example, Facebook is a social media website that “enables people to
connect, share, discover, and communicate with each other,” 100 while Jon’s Guns
is a federally-licensed firearms dealer that uses Facebook to advertise firearms
for sale at its store location. 101 Facebook did not unpublish Jon’s Guns’ business
page in an attempt to monopolize the firearms industry; 102 Facebook is not in the
business of selling firearms. 103 Rather, Facebook has created community
standards prohibiting unwanted content on its website, and Jon’s Guns’ business
page was flagged for allegedly violating these standards. 104
Additionally, YouTube is a platform where content creators can share videos,
and its competitors are other similar platforms, not content creators using the
platform, such as Dave Rubin. 105 YouTube did not demonetize The Rubin
Report’s videos to monopolize political talk shows; it did so in an attempt to
appease advertisers because the videos dealt with controversial topics. 106
In contrast, the FTC recently investigated Google for harming competitors by
allegedly preferencing its own services on its search results page, including
Google shopping and travel services. 107 Although the FTC found a valid business
justification for Google’s practice, this investigation demonstrates that
anticompetitive conduct warranting an investigation under Section 2 requires
more than the discretionary removal of content from the social media pages of
non-competing businesses. 108
98. See Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307 (holding that “in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain
a monopoly,” Section 2 does not prohibit a private company from exercising its “own independent discretion as
to parties with whom [it] will deal”).
99. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how social media companies, specifically Facebook and YouTube,
exercise discretion in determining which content on business pages should be flagged or removed).
100. Facebook, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 1, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1326801/000132680118000009/fb-12312017x10k.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
101. Jon’s Guns, supra note 1; Soto, supra note 2.
102. See Soto, supra note 2 (noting Jon’s Guns’ Facebook page was unpublished after certain posts
allegedly violated the social network’s community standards for regulated goods).
103. See Facebook, Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 100 (noting Facebook is a social media
website focused on enabling “people to connect, share, discover, and communicate with each other”).
104. Community Standards, supra note 4; Soto, supra note 2.
105. See Company Overview of YouTube, LLC, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/research/
stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=24603346 (last visited Apr. 6, 2018) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (describing YouTube as a platform where content creators can share videos); The Rubin
Report, supra note 12 (Dave Rubin hosts The Rubin Report, a talk show on YouTube, during which he
discusses “politics, polarizing issues, current events, and more” with thought leaders and authors.).
106. Thoughts on YouTube Demonetization, supra note 11.
107. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, supra note 50.
108. See id. (describing the FTC’s investigation of Google “relating to allegations that Google unfairly
preference[d] its own content on the Google search results page and selectively demote[d] its competitors’
content from those results”).
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As such, even if social media companies achieve monopoly power, their
conduct likely will not fall within the ambit of Section 2 as their control of
content on business pages is not anticompetitive. 109 Thus, for Facebook and other
leading social media companies able to control content in a way that impacts
business users, regulation must be achieved through other means. 110
B. Analogizing Historical Justifications for the Regulation of Industries to
Modern Social Media Companies
Although social media companies are not violating the existing antitrust
regulatory framework through their discretionary control of content on business
pages,111 their decisions are still harmful to businesses. 112 Additionally, social
media companies are not subject to other regulations that address this behavior. 113
Thus, proposing new regulations to govern this conduct requires examining the
rationale for imposing regulations on other types of industries deemed essential
facilities.114
Access to essential facilities is a contentious area of federal antitrust law. 115
The essential facility doctrine is a “subset of the . . . ‘refusal to deal’ cases” and
imposes a “limitation on the general rule that a firm has no obligation to deal
with its competitors.”116 Under the essential facility doctrine, an owner violates
Section 2 if he or she refuses to share an essential facility with others. 117 The
United States has a long history of applying this doctrine in numerous cases

109. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 298 (defining anticompetitive conduct as acts that “are reasonably
capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of rivals”).
110. See Waller, supra note 21, at 1804 (noting that existing social media companies have not violated
Section 2).
111. See supra Part III.A (discussing that social media companies’ control of content on business pages
is not anticompetitive as they are not controlling the content in an effort to monopolize a particular industry but
rather are exercising discretion as to the content posted on their platforms).
112. See Soto, supra note 2 (quoting Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted “sales drop
immediately” if the company does not post frequently on its Facebook page); Thoughts on YouTube
Demonetization, supra note 11 (discussing that when YouTube demonetizes content, producing the content
becomes less profitable or even unprofitable, which is not a sustainable business model).
113. See Facebook, Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 100.
[Facebook is] subject to a number of U.S. federal and state and foreign laws and regulations that affect
companies conducting business on the Internet. . . . These may involve user privacy, data protection, and
personal information, rights of publicity, content, intellectual property, advertising, marketing, distribution, data
security, data retention and deletion, personal information, electronic contracts and other communications,
competition, protection of minors, consumer protection, telecommunications, product liability, taxation,
economic or other trade prohibitions or sanctions, securities law compliance, and online payment services.
Id.
114. See infra Part III.B (discussing essential facilities and industries that have been regulated as such).
115. Robert Pitofsky, Donna Patterson, & Jonathan Hooks, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under
United States Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 443 (2002).
116. Id. at 446.
117. HOVENKAMP, supra note 63, at 336.
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involving utilities and railroads. 118 Subsections 1, 2, and 3 discuss the history of
and justifications for the regulation of public utilities 119 and railroads120 and
common law innkeeper obligations, 121 respectively, and compares the companies
in these industries to social media companies 122 in considering why it is
necessary to regulate social media companies’ control of content on business
pages.123
1. Public Utilities
Public utilities generally constitute natural monopolies,124 which arise in
industries where operating only one firm is most efficient. 125 The goods and
services provided by such industries, including water, electricity, telephone, and
natural gas, typically require large capital investments to create networks to
deliver the goods and services. 126 For example, installing water pipes is capital
intensive,127 and it would be inconvenient and wasteful for two different
companies to “dig up the road” to install “duplicate set[s] of water pipes.” 128
Thus, a natural monopoly exists. 129
The goods and services provided by public utilities are generally deemed
essential,130 meaning the goods and services are “indispensable for human life,”
and “[s]ociety would be put to severe hardship if [the] services are not made
available.”131 As such, although natural monopolies do not require government
regulation, public utilities are regulated to ensure users can access such goods
and services and to provide access at a fair price. 132
Similarly, certain social media websites are becoming essential. 133 The
118. Pitofsky, Patterson, & Hooks, supra note 115, at 445–47.
119. See infra Part III.B.1.
120. See infra Part III.B.2.
121. See infra Part III.B.3.
122. See infra Parts III.B.1–3.
123. See infra Part IV.
124. Public Utilities, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/
economics-business-and-labor/businesses-and-occupations/public-utility (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
125. Tejvan Pettinger, Natural Monopoly, ECONOMICSHELP.ORG (Nov. 28, 2016),
https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/natural-monopoly/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
126. Id.; Public Utilities, supra note 124.
127. Pettinger, supra note 125.
128. Id.; Public Utilities, supra note 124.
129. Id.
130. Public Utilities, supra note 124.
131. Public Utility | Meaning | Characteristics | Rights | Duties, MONEY MATTERS,
https://accountlearning.com/public-utility-meaning-characteristics-rights-duties/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
132. Public Utilities, supra note 124.
133. Ambrose Thompson, Social Media as Public Expectation: The New Public Utility, N.Y. PUB. LIBR.
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creation of social media websites is not as capital intensive as the construction of
infrastructure for public utilities, which allows for a more competitive industry. 134
However, high user volume makes certain social media websites essential. 135
This “network effect” makes it nearly impossible for new social media
companies to compete with market leaders, and thus leaves businesses with
limited online platforms to connect to consumers. 136 In addition, the Internet is
becoming more and more vital for consumer purchases. 137 Traditional brick-andmortar stores are rapidly transitioning to web-based business models, forcing
consumers to turn to online options to gain access to goods and services. 138
2. Railroads
The advent of railroads in the United States brought widespread economic
expansion in the late nineteenth century as goods could be delivered faster and at
a lower cost to a larger subset of the population.139 As the railroads rapidly
expanded, small businesses and farmers alleged the railroads charged higher rates
for short hauls than long hauls—essentially favoring large corporations over
small businesses.140 In response, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act
on February 4, 1887, to regulate railroad rates. 141 The Interstate Commerce Act
“limited railroads to rates that were ‘reasonable and just,’ forbade rebates to
high-volume users, and made it illegal to charge higher rates for shorter hauls.” 142
In addition, rail carriers143 are codified as common carriers144 and must
(June 30, 2010), https://www.nypl.org/blog/2010/06/30/social-media-public-expectation (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); Peter Swire, Should the Leading Online Tech Companies be Regulated
as Public Utilities?, LAWFARE (Aug. 2, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/should-leading-onlinetech-companies-be-regulated-public-utilities (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
134. Swire, supra note 133.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.; Hainla, supra note 40.
138. Yuki Noguchi, Retailers Scrambling to Adjust to Changing Consumer Habits, NPR (May 2, 2017,
4:17 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/02/526560158/a-rapid-shakeup-for-retailers-as-consumer-habitschange (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
139. American Railroads in the 20th Century, SMITHSONIAN, http://americanhistory.si.edu/americamove/themes/american-railroads (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
140. The Interstate Commerce Act is Passed, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/minute/Interstate_Commerce_Act_Is_Passed.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10102(5) (West 1995) (defining “rail carrier” as “a person providing common carrier
railroad transportation for compensation, but does not include street, suburban, or interurban electric railways
not operated as part of the general system of rail transportation”).
144. Common Carrier, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “common carrier” as “a
commercial enterprise that holds itself out to the public as offering to transport freight or passengers for a fee
. . . [and] is required by law to transport freight or passengers without refusal if the approved fare or charge is
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provide “transportation or service on reasonable request.” 145 The status of rail
carriers as common carriers imposes statutory duties on both shippers and the
public.146 Thus, rail carriers may not “assert unilaterally a right not to carry
certain commodities unless the law permits.” 147
Railroads were regulated, in part, because they favored large corporations
over small businesses and farmers,148 and, at the time, were the primary means
through which businesses could transfer goods to consumers throughout the
United States.149 Much like railroads in the past, social media websites have
become a primary platform for businesses to connect to and transact with
consumers,150 in part due to a shift in consumer preferences.151 Thus, certain
social media websites have become critical to the economy, 152 similar to
railroads.153 Furthermore, discriminatory practices by social media companies in
the removal of content from business pages are becoming evident, 154 impacting
businesses economically similar to railroads’ discriminatory pricing. 155
Railroads, as common carriers, are required to provide reasonable
transportation or service to the public 156 and may not decline to carry certain
commodities without legal justification. 157 Social media companies are analogous
to common carriers as they offer their websites for use by the general public. 158
paid”).
145. 49 U.S.C.A. § 11101(a) (West 1996).
146. Akron, Canton, & Youngstown R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 611 F.2d 1162, 1168
(6th Cir. 1979).
147. Michael McBride, Railroad Transportation of Nuclear Waste and Other Hazardous Materials,
VANNESS FELDMAN LLP (Apr. 2008), http://www.vnf.com/697 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
148. The Interstate Commerce Act is Passed, supra note 140.
149. American Railroads in the 20th Century, supra note 139.
150. Smith, supra note 33; Hainla, supra note 40.
151. Yuki Noguchi, supra note 138.
152. See Dentzel, supra note 18 (“[A]ll sorts of advantages arise from e-commerce, which has become a
major distribution channel for goods and services. You can book airline tickets, get a T-shirt from Australia, or
buy food at an online grocery store. New applications support secure business transactions and create new
commercial opportunities.”); see also supra Part II (discussing the rise in Internet and social media use and its
impact on modern businesses).
153. American Railroads in the 20th Century, supra note 139.
154. See Schatz & Sammon, supra note 6 (“Overzealous gun-group flaggers sometimes hit the wrong
targets. The gun-sale ban only affects sales between individuals, not sales by federally licensed firearms
dealers. . . . [P]ages for brick-and-mortar gun shops have been taken down wrongfully at times.”); Monteiro,
supra note 6 (“Facebook is erratic in following its own guidelines.”).
155. The Interstate Commerce Act is Passed, supra note 140; see also Soto, supra note 2 (quoting
Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted “sales drop immediately” if the company does not post
frequently on its Facebook page); Thoughts on YouTube Demonetization, supra note 11 (discussing that when
YouTube demonetizes content, producing the content becomes less profitable or even unprofitable, which is not
a sustainable business model).
156. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10102(5) (West 1995).
157. McBride, supra note 147.
158. See How Do I Create a Facebook Account?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/188157
731232424?helpref=topq (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
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Thus, the discretionary control of content on business pages is comparable to rail
carriers’ refusal to carry certain commodities.159
3. Innkeepers
Because hotels provide accommodations to the public, 160 and to ensure “the
unhampered flow of commerce” by indiscriminately providing shelter for
merchants and travelers, a common law duty evolved limiting innkeepers’ rights
to exclude guests.161 An innkeepers’ right to deny accommodations varies by
state, but is often limited to situations in which the guest is unable to pay, the
guest appears to be a danger to themselves or others, or the hotel has no
vacancy.162
For example, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the appellant
owner-operator of the Heart of Atlanta Motel, which hosted a number of out-ofstate travelers, refused to accommodate African Americans, arguing he had a
right to choose with whom to do business. 163 The appellees countered that the
appellant’s denial of access frustrated interstate commerce by interfering with
interstate travel. 164 The Court agreed, holding that because the motel
accommodated interstate travelers, Congress may remove any obstructions to
access as permitted under the Commerce Clause. 165
Similar to the obligation of innkeepers to provide access to accommodations
necessary for merchants and travelers, 166 social media websites must be subject to
regulation over the discretionary control of content on business pages as these
websites are critical platforms for a growing number of businesses 167 and have
become increasingly important to commerce. 168
(noting that to create a Facebook account, a user need only be at least 13 years old and enter his or her “name,
email or mobile phone number, password, date of birth and gender”).
159. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how social media companies, specifically Facebook and YouTube,
exercise discretion in determining which content on business pages should be flagged or removed).
160. Legal Rights and Responsibilities of the Innkeeper, HOSPITALITY ACADEMY, INC.,
https://www.hospitalityacademy.net/38-legal-rights-and-responsibilities-of-the-innkeeper/ (last visited Apr. 4,
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
161. Innkeeper’s Right to Exclude or Eject Guests, 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 417, 419 (1938).
162. Legal Rights and Responsibilities of the Innkeeper, supra note 160; see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 30-A, § 3838 (2013) (“An innkeeper . . . may refuse or deny any accommodations to . . . [a] [p]erson
unwilling or unable to pay . . . ; [a] minor . . . ; [a] person the innkeeper . . . reasonably believes is bringing in
property that may be dangerous to other[s] . . . ; [if the] limit on occupants [is] exceeded . . . ; or [a person who]
[v]iolates laws or rules [or] endangers others.”).
163. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243–44 (1964).
164. Id. at 244.
165. Id. at 261.
166. Innkeeper’s Right to Exclude or Eject Guests, supra note 161, at 419.
167. See Soto, supra note 2 (quoting Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted “sales drop
immediately” if the company does not post frequently on its Facebook page); Thoughts on YouTube
Demonetization, supra note 11 (discussing that when YouTube demonetizes content, producing the content
becomes less profitable or even unprofitable, which is not a sustainable business model).
168. See Dentzel, supra note 18 (“[A]ll sorts of advantages arise from e-commerce, which has become a
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C. Market Failure as an Additional Justification for Regulation
Regulation is often justified if there is a market failure.169 Most companies
strive to sell something of value to any consumer who is willing to pay to
generate revenue sufficient to carry on the business. 170 However, market failure
occurs when companies cannot be relied upon to allocate resources efficiently in
a free market.171 For example, a motel operating under a normal business model
would presumably wish to accommodate all paying patrons to maximize
revenue.172 However, this business model failed in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
when the owner-operator of the Heart of Atlanta Motel refused to accommodate
African Americans—acting on his own personal preferences rather than in the
best interests of the business. 173 When this sort of market failure exists, it is not
addressed privately but rather through regulation.174
Market failure has developed with social media companies. 175 Because many
social media companies generate revenue from advertising, they are incentivized
to draw more users to their websites. 176 While simply maximizing users is the
normal market incentive,177 the market does not take into account that social
media companies censor or remove certain users to appease other users or
advertisers.178 Thus, the normal market incentive for social media companies to
attract all possible users fails.179
major distribution channel for goods and services. You can book airline tickets, get a T-shirt from Australia, or
buy food at an online grocery store. New applications support secure business transactions and create new
commercial opportunities.”); see also supra Part II (discussing the rise in Internet and social media use and its
impact on modern businesses).
169. Matthew Richardson, Market Failure Cannot be Resolved Without Regulation, BIG THINK,
http://bigthink.com/experts-corner/market-failure-cannot-be-resolved-without-regulation (last visited Apr. 4,
2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
170. Josh Kaufman, Business: Understanding How They Work, FRESH BUS. THINKING (June 29, 2011),
http://www.freshbusinessthinking.com/business-understanding-how-they-work/ (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
171. Market Failure, ECONOMICSHELP, https://www.economicshelp.org/micro-economic-essays/
marketfailure/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
172. See Kaufman, supra note 170 (suggesting that successful businesses provide products or services
that consumers want or need to generate revenue sufficient to continue operations).
173. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 243–44.
174. Richardson, supra note 169; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 261 (holding that
because the motel accommodated interstate travelers, Congress may remove any obstructions to access as
permitted under the Commerce Clause).
175. See infra Part III.C (discussing the failure of the normal market incentive for social media
companies to generate revenue through maximizing users).
176. Jon Russell, Revenue from Social Networks to Top $16.9bn in 2012, Advertising Alone Worth
$8.8bn: Report, TNW (July 25, 2012), https://thenextweb.com/socialmedia/2012/07/25/revenue-from-socialnetworks-to-top-16-9bn-in-2012-advertising-alone-worth-8-8bn-report/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
177. Id.
178. See Thoughts on YouTube Demonetization, supra note 11 (discussing YouTube’s removal of
advertisements from The Rubin Report’s videos that dealt with controversial topics to appease advertisers).
179. See supra Part III.C (discussing the failure of the normal market incentive for social media
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IV. A PROPOSAL FOR NEW REGULATIONS
Although the reach of the existing antitrust regulatory framework is limited
and does not encompass the discretionary control of content on business pages by
social media companies, 180 this discretionary control impacts the ability of
businesses, including Jon’s Guns and The Rubin Report, to compete in the
marketplace.181 Regulations governing the discretionary control of content on
business pages is justified due to both the similarities between social media
companies and companies in other regulated industries and the market failure
that exists with social media companies. 182
Section A discusses the current lack of uniformity and transparency in social
media companies’ control of content on business pages, followed by a proposal
that the FTC publish uniform guidelines concerning the control of content on
business pages and establish an independent review board that businesses can
appeal to.183 Section B then concludes with a discussion regarding the objections
to imposing additional regulations on social media companies. 184
A. Proposal to Enhance Uniformity and Transparency Concerning Social
Media Websites’ Control of Content on Business Pages
Users of Facebook and other social media websites have granted social
media companies the power to control their posted content according to
community guidelines published on the respective social media websites. 185
However, such guidelines are “vague and confusing” and lack transparency. 186
Facebook, for example, relies principally on Facebook users themselves to report
activity on the website that they believe violates the website’s community
companies to generate revenue through maximizing users).
180. See supra Part III.A (discussing that even if a social media company were to achieve monopoly
power, its control of content must be anticompetitive in nature to violate antitrust laws).
181. See Soto, supra note 2 (quoting Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted “sales drop
immediately” if the company does not post frequently on its Facebook page); Thoughts on YouTube
Demonetization, supra note 11 (discussing that when YouTube demonetizes content, producing the content
becomes less profitable or even unprofitable, which is not a sustainable business model).
182. See supra Parts III.B–C (arguing that the similarities between historically regulated industries and
social media companies, combined with the market failure of social media companies to maximize users, serves
as grounds to introduce new regulations for the discretionary removal of content on business pages by social
media companies).
183. See infra Part IV.A.
184. See infra Part IV.B.
185. Community Standards, supra note 4.
186. Ian Sherr, How Facebook Censors Your Posts (FAQ), CNET (Sept. 9, 2016, 9:58 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/how-zuckerberg-facebook-censors-korryn-gaines-philando-castile-dallas-policeyour-posts-faq/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Schatz & Sammon, supra note
6 (“Overzealous gun-group flaggers sometimes hit the wrong targets. The gun-sale ban only affects sales
between individuals, not sales by federally licensed firearms dealers. . . . [P]ages for brick-and-mortar gun
shops have been taken down wrongfully at times.”); Monteiro, supra note 6 (“Facebook is erratic in following
its own guidelines.”).
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standards.187 Facebook then has a team of employees who reviews these reports,
which leaves the removal of content subject to the discretion of whichever
employee is assigned the review. 188 It is not clear how these individuals
determine whether content violates community standards, nor is it clear what
course of action will be taken if the content is found to violate community
standards.189 “For instance, [Facebook] may warn someone for a first violation,
but if [Facebook] continue[s] to see further violations [it] may restrict a person’s
ability to post on Facebook or ban the person from Facebook.”190 Again, the
consequences are not clear and are prone to the reviewer’s discretion, which
varies depending on the employee reviewing the content. 191
Demonetization decisions, specifically by YouTube, should also be more
uniform and transparent as there is “tension between YouTube’s loyalty to
advertisers versus its loyalty to creators.” 192 YouTube advertisers pay to target
viewers directly as opposed to “buying ad space on a specific program.” 193 For
example, a video game company may target “white male[s] between the ages of
18 and 35” and will want their advertisement shown on any videos that this
particular demographic views. 194 However, there may be certain videos this
demographic views that the video game company does not want its
advertisements associated with.195 YouTube has responded with algorithms that
flag videos as inappropriate, making the videos “unavailable to . . . users,
lowering traffic numbers and cutting off creators from potential income.” 196
This approach has resulted in “bizarre flagging,” leaving content creators
with no option but to go through an appeal process with YouTube. 197 Yet
“YouTube only reviews appeals from videos that get more than 1,000 views over
a seven-day period or from channels with more than 10,000 subscribers.” 198
Thus, businesses with smaller channels are at a disadvantage, losing out on
income and the removal of flags from their content. 199 In addition, similar to
187. Community Standards, supra note 4; see also Schatz & Sammon, supra note 6 (“Overzealous gungroup flaggers sometimes hit the wrong targets.”).
188. Community Standards, supra note 4.
189. Sherr, supra note 186; see also Community Standards, supra note 4 (“[T]he consequences for
violating [Facebook’s] Community Standards vary depending on the severity of the violation and the person’s
history on Facebook.”).
190. Community Standards, supra note 4.
191. See id. (“[T]he consequences for violating [Facebook’s] Community Standards vary depending on
the severity of the violation and the person’s history on Facebook.”).
192. Ian Birnbaum, YouTube is Leaving its Creators in the Dark, THE OUTLINE (Sept. 18, 2017, 9:23
AM), https://theoutline.com/post/2258/youtube-is-leaving-its-creators-in-the-dark (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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Facebook’s employee review process, YouTube’s appeals process again enables
the social media company to use its discretion to determine whether content is
appropriate.200
This seemingly erratic control of content deprives businesses, including Jon’s
Guns and The Rubin Report, of crucial platforms from which they promote their
businesses.201 Meanwhile, businesses posting similar content may remain
unaffected merely because users have not reported the content for review, leaving
these businesses with a competitive advantage and depriving consumers of the
ability to consider all available product and service offerings.202
Thus, social media companies’ ability to control content on business pages at
their discretion requires checks and balances as it has led to confusing and
inconsistent results, causing a disparate impact on businesses. 203 First, the FTC
should publish uniform guidelines concerning the control of content on business
pages by social media companies so businesses are subject to clear and
transparent guidelines. 204 A proposal for specific guidelines is beyond the scope
of this Comment. However, when establishing guidelines, the FTC should
consult with social media companies and businesses in industries that are heavily
impacted by the control of content on business pages. 205 These heavily impacted
companies would likely include firearms dealers and producers of controversial
news programs.206
Additionally, the FTC must determine which social media websites will be
200. Id.; Community Standards, supra note 4.
201. See supra Part II (discussing the rise in Internet and social media use and its impact on modern
businesses); Soto, supra note 2 (quoting Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted “sales drop
immediately” if the company does not post frequently on its Facebook page); Thoughts on YouTube
Demonetization, supra note 11 (discussing that when YouTube demonetizes content, producing the content
becomes less profitable or even unprofitable, which is not a sustainable business model).
202. Sherr, supra note 186; see also Community Standards, supra note 4 (noting that Facebook has teams
of employees reviewing content that has been reported by users for alleged violations of its community
standards).
203. Sherr, supra note 186; see also supra Part IV.A (discussing the consequences of the discretionary
inconsistencies applied by employees tasked with determining whether content violates community guidelines).
204. See id. (noting Facebook’s policies are “vague and confusing”); About the FTC, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (noting the FTC was established to “protect consumers by preventing anticompetitive, deceptive,
and unfair business practices”); Schatz & Sammon, supra note 6 (“Overzealous gun-group flaggers sometimes
hit the wrong targets. The gun-sale ban only affects sales between individuals, not sales by federally licensed
firearms dealers. . . . [P]ages for brick-and-mortar gun shops have been taken down wrongfully at times.”);
Monteiro, supra note 6 (“Facebook is erratic in following its own guidelines.”).
205. See A Guide to the Rulemaking Process, OFF. OF THE FED. REG., available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that an agency may “gather information through
unstructured processes and informal conversations with people and organizations interested in the issues”).
206. See Schatz & Sammon, supra note 6 (“Overzealous gun-group flaggers sometimes hit the wrong
targets. The gun-sale ban only affects sales between individuals, not sales by federally licensed firearms
dealers. . . . [P]ages for brick-and-mortar gun shops have been taken down wrongfully at times.”); Thoughts on
YouTube Demonetization, supra note 11 (discussing YouTube’s removal of advertisements from The Rubin
Report’s videos that dealt with controversial topics to appease advertisers).
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subject to these guidelines. 207 A number of definitions exist as to what constitutes
a “social media website,” but these websites generally “allow users to create
profiles, connect with friends, post comments, send private messages, and form
relationships with other users of the same website who access their profile.” 208
While Facebook clearly has these features, so do Amazon, Groupon, and online
dating websites, among others.209 Thus, “social media website” must be carefully
defined.210
The FTC should also establish an appeals board to provide an independent
review over content controlled by social media companies on business pages. 211
Any content that complies with the FTC’s uniform guidelines should not be
removed or demonetized by social media companies, 212 and there should be fines
for social media companies who improperly control content to encourage a more
thoughtful review of flagged content. 213
For example, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) has a formal complaint process for federal employees or job
applicants who allege they have been discriminated against in violation of federal
laws and regulations. 214 If the EEOC decides to investigate an individual’s
complaint, it has 180 days to issue a final decision, which is likely shorter than
the amount of time it would take to litigate. 215 If the individual disagrees with the
EEOC’s decision, he or she can “appeal the decision to the EEOC or challenge it
in federal district court.”216
Because social media websites have evolved into critical platforms for
businesses, it is important that the relatively small number of leading social
media companies not make decisions concerning content on business pages

207. See Waller, supra note 21, at 1778 (noting that “social networking websites” are “often
overextended to include many . . . interactive websites and software platforms where user content is generated
and shared”).
208. Id. at 1776.
209. Id. at 1777–78.
210. Id. at 1776–80 (noting that “social networking websites” are “often overextended to include many
. . . interactive websites and software platforms where user content is generated and shared”).
211. See About the FTC, supra note 204 (noting the FTC was established to “protect consumers by
preventing anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices”).
212. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the need for clear and transparent uniform guidelines governing
social media companies’ control of content on business pages).
213. See Fine and Punishment: The Economics of Crime Suggests that Corporate Fines Should be Even
Higher, THE ECONOMIST (July 21, 2012), https://www.economist.com/node/21559315 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (suggesting that regulators should impose penalties large enough to offset
the benefit of the offense).
214. Overview of the Federal Sector EEO Complaint Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/complaint_overview.cfm (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
215. Id.; see also What to Expect – A Lawsuit Chronology, F INDLAW, http://litigation.findlaw.com/filinga-lawsuit/what-to-expect-a-lawsuit-chronology.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (noting litigation can “take from as little as six months, to as long as years”).
216. Overview of the Federal Sector EEO Complaint Process, supra note 214.
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without broader accountability. 217 FTC oversight concerning social media
companies’ control over content on business pages resolves the discretionary
problem that occurs and offers businesses the opportunity to appeal to a board of
individuals whose positions are obtained through democratic means.218
B. Objections to Regulating Social Media Companies
The question of how much to regulate is the subject of highly contentious
debate over concerns about where to draw the line between not enough and too
much.219 The debate surrounding the regulation of social media companies is
particularly polarized. 220 Some are open to the idea of labeling social media
websites as public utilities requiring regulation. 221 Others are opposed, arguing
that regulations “wreaked havoc” on many industries in the past, including
communications and media.222 Those opposed also argue that “[t]he very act of
imposing ‘utility’ status on a service or platform tends to shelter it from
competition and lock them in as real monopolies for the long-haul.”223 In
addition, public utilities are “non-innovative”—”[c]onsumers are typically given
access to a plain vanilla service at a ‘fair’ rate, but without any incentive to earn a
greater return, innovations suffers.” 224
While these are valid concerns, the proposed regulations do not fix rates, but
merely provide for uniform guidelines and an appeals process to limit social
media companies’ discretion over content on business pages. 225 Thus, it is
difficult to argue that innovation will be stifled, unless the threat of fines for
social media companies who improperly remove content is found to stifle

217. See supra Part I (highlighting social media companies’ role as gatekeepers and the impact their
control over content may have on businesses using their websites as a primary advertising platform).
218. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the need for clear and transparent uniform guidelines governing
social media companies’ control of content on business pages); About the FTC: Commissioners, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review) (“The Commission is headed by five Commissioners, nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate, each serving a seven-year term. No more than three Commissioners can be of the
same political party. The President chooses one Commissioner to act as Chairman.”).
219. Eli Combs, Denise Landry & Seth Goldman, When Does Regulation Work?, YALE SCH. OF MGMT.
(Feb. 6, 2014), https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/when-does-regulation-work (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
220. Adam Thierer, The Danger of Making Facebook, LinkedIn, Google and Twitter Public Utilities,
FORBES (July 24, 2011, 3:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2011/07/24/the-danger-of-makingfacebook-linkedin-google-and-twitter-public-utilities/#12baaf967d0d (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the need for clear and transparent uniform guidelines governing
social media companies’ control of content on business pages and for establishing an independent review board
that businesses can appeal to if their content is impacted).
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innovation.226
Another objection to regulating social media companies is the cost passed to
consumers as social media companies adjust to new regulations. 227 Consumers
may actually have to pay to access websites.228 However, this returns to the
question of where to draw the line with regulation. 229 Given the increasing
economic significance of social media companies, it is unclear whether
consumers would discontinue use if required to pay for access. 230 Further, it
remains to be determined whether the cost passed to consumers is enough to
offset the benefit of providing uniform guidelines and an independent appeals
board to protect both businesses and consumers from the widely varying
discretion of social media companies.231
V. CONCLUSION
The modern development of social media websites and their impact on both
national and international commerce 232 requires us to rethink the extent to which
social media companies should be allowed to control content on their websites in
ways that impact business activities and, ultimately, consumers. 233 The existing
antitrust regulatory framework is limited and does not encompass the social
media companies’ discretionary control of content on business pages. 234 As a
result, business pages have been subject to erratic discretionary control by social
media companies, which impacts the ability of businesses to compete in the
marketplace.235

226. Thierer, supra note 220; see also supra Part IV.A (proposing fines for social media companies who
improperly control users’ content).
227. Thierer, supra note 220.
228. Id.
229. Combs, Landry & Goldman, supra note 219.
230. See supra Part II (discussing the rise in Internet use, the importance of using social media websites
as advertising platforms to connect with consumers, and the impact of social media websites on consumer
purchasing activity).
231. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the need for clear and transparent uniform guidelines governing
social media companies’ control of content on business pages and for establishing an independent review board
that businesses can appeal to if their content is impacted).
232. See supra Part II (discussing the rise in Internet use, the importance of using social media websites
as advertising platforms to connect with consumers, and the impact of social media websites on consumer
purchasing activity).
233. See supra Part I (highlighting social media companies’ role as gatekeepers and the impact their
control over content may have on businesses using their websites as a primary advertising platform).
234. See supra Part III.A (discussing that even if a social media company were to achieve monopoly
power, its control of content must be anticompetitive in nature to violate antitrust laws).
235. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the consequences of discretionary inconsistencies applied by
employees tasked with determining whether content violates community guidelines); Soto, supra note 2
(quoting Jonathan Hall, owner of Jon’s Guns, who noted “sales drop immediately” if the company does not post
frequently on its Facebook page); Thoughts on YouTube Demonetization, supra note 11 (discussing that when
YouTube demonetizes content, producing the content becomes less profitable or even unprofitable, which is not
a sustainable business model).
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Given the similarities between social media companies and companies in
other regulated industries and the market failure that exists with social media
companies, regulation over their discretionary control of content on business
pages is justified. 236 Despite the objections to regulation, 237 it is important to have
checks and balances in the form of uniform guidelines and an independent
appeals board to limit social media companies’ discretionary control over content
on business pages and to hold them accountable for improper exercises of
control.238

236. See supra Parts III.B–C (arguing that the similarities between historically regulated industries and
social media companies, combined with the market failure of social media companies to maximize users, serves
as grounds to introduce new regulations for the discretionary removal of content on business pages by social
media companies).
237. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the objections to regulating social media companies).
238. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the need for clear and transparent uniform guidelines governing
social media companies’ control of content on business pages and for establishing an independent review board
that businesses can appeal to if their content is impacted).
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